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Постинституционализм: за пределами институционального мейнстрима
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-5-107-140
Аннотация
В статье рассматривается внутренний дуализм институциональной экономики на современном этапе ее развития, связанный с разделением ортодоксального течения и его оппозиции — постинституционализма. Предлагается повестка дня перспективных постинституциональных исследований, затрагивающая широкий круг вопросов за рамками «Стандартной модели» — от перехода к интегративным трактовкам институтов до внедрения новой парадигмы анализа институциональной эволюции. Предложено переориентировать трансакционный анализ институтов с минимизации издержек на максимизацию генерируемой ценности. Обсуждается возможность рассматривать любые формы и траектории развития институтов вне оценочных критериев, отказываясь от традиции негативного маркирования институциональных аномалий. Показано, что в фокусе постинституцио нализма находится институциональная сложность, для изучения которой нужно преодолеть редукционистские методологические подходы институционального мейнстрима.
Об авторе
Д. П. Фролов
Волгоградский государственный технический университет
Россия
Россия
Фролов Даниил Петрович, д. э. н., проф. кафедры экономики и предпринимательства
Волгоград
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Рецензия
При поддержке: Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке Российского фонда фундаментальных исследований, проект № 18-010-00832
Для цитирования:
Фролов Д.П. Постинституционализм: за пределами институционального мейнстрима. Вопросы экономики. 2020;(5):107-140. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-5-107-140
For citation:
Frolov D.P. Post-institutionalism: Beyond the institutional mainstream. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(5):107-140. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-5-107-140
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