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A panoramic view on the evolution of monetary systems (On the book by S. A. Andryushin “Monetary systems: From origins to cryptocurrency”)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-141-150
Abstract
What is the driving force of the evolution of monetary systems in the longrun? Based on an in-depth analysis of economic history and the findings of contemporary studies, Prof. S. Andryushin argues that it is the perpetual rivalry between centralization and decentralization. This article juxtaposes arguments for and against such a viewpoint. In particular, I assert that centralization or decentralization per se cannot safeguard financial stability, nor secure optimality of monetary policy. Both trends need to be assessed alongside with concomitant political and economic factors as well as institutional environment. Against this backdrop, the ongoing trend towards decentralization associated with cryptocurrencies is so far unlikely to remedy all the drawbacks of the contemporary monetary system.
Keywords
monetary system,
monetary policy,
cryptocurrency,
financial crisis,
financial stability,
central bank
JEL: E42, E58, G00, G01
References
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Review
For citations:
Stolbov M.I. A panoramic view on the evolution of monetary systems (On the book by S. A. Andryushin “Monetary systems: From origins to cryptocurrency”). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(3):141-150. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-141-150
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