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Protection of Russian industrial companies from violent pressure on business: The effectiveness of the judicial mechanism
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-84-97
Abstract
A survey of the top management of 1716 industrial companies in Russia in 2018 shows differences in the likelihood of losing property as a result of raider attacks. In this article, we analyze the factors that affect the subjective attitudes about the level of security from violent pressure on business. We show that large companies with political connections can effectively use the judicial mechanism to protect their interests. Small companies without political connections also feel quite protected avoiding participation in the courts and staying imperceptible. Companies that have unsuccessful experience in litigation see the greatest risks for themselves. To receive additional protection such companies participate in business associations.
About the Author
Anton P. Kazun
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Kazun A.P. Protection of Russian industrial companies from violent pressure on business: The effectiveness of the judicial mechanism. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(3):84-97. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-84-97
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