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What kind of Russian firms get state support? The analysis of changes in priorities under crisis conditions
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-47-62
Abstract
The paper analyzes the shifts in government priorities in terms of support of big and medium manufacturing enterprises amid 2008—2009 and 2014—2015 crises. Based on the data of 2009, 2014 and 2018 surveys of Russian manufacturing firms, using logit regressions we identify factors that affect the receipt of financial and organizational support at different levels of government. The analysis shows that in 2012—2013 the share of manufacturing firms that received state support shrank significantly as compared to 2007—2008; moreover, the support concentrated on enterprises that had access to lobbying resource (such as state participation in the ownership or business associations membership). In 2016—2017 the scale of state support coverage recovered. However, the support at all levels of government was provided to firms that carried out investment and provided assistance to regional or local authorities in social development of the region, while the factor of state participation in the ownership became insignificant. The paper provides possible explanation for these shifts in the criteria of state support provision in Russia.
About the Authors
Andrei A. Yakovlev
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
Nina V. Ershova
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
Olga M. Uvarova
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Yakovlev A.A., Ershova N.V., Uvarova O.M. What kind of Russian firms get state support? The analysis of changes in priorities under crisis conditions. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(3):47-62. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-3-47-62
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