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Планирование и оппортунизм

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-1-22-39

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Аннотация

В статье анализируются возможности проявления оппортунистического поведения в рамках различных типов планирования: самопланирования, коллективного, планирования по поручению и директивного. Показано, что во всех этих типах, кроме самопланирования, есть стимулы к тем или иным проявлениям оппортунизма. В связи с этим рассматриваются два популярных направления в теории планирования: партиципативное и коммуникативное планирование, которые также открыты для оппортунизма. На основе проведенного анализа выявлены сферы рыночной экономики, где государственное планирование может оказаться более действенным, чем рыночный механизм координации.

Об авторе

В. Л. Тамбовцев
МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова
Россия
д.  э.  н., проф., главный научный сотрудник экономического факультета МГУ имени М.  В.   Ломоносова (Москва)


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Для цитирования:


Тамбовцев В.Л. Планирование и оппортунизм. Вопросы экономики. 2017;(1):22-39. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-1-22-39

For citation:


Tambovtsev V. Planning and opportunism. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2017;(1):22-39. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-1-22-39

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ISSN 0042-8736 (Print)