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Bank of Russia and bank supervision: Together forever?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-10-85-98
Abstract
The paper discusses the feasibility of institutional changes in the Russian banking regulation (supervision). The historical and modern practice of the organization of regulatory activity in financial markets is described. Traditional theoretical arguments in favor of and against combining the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision within the Bank of Russia are considered and analyzed under current conditions. The impact of the global financial crisis is taken into account in terms of the need to institutionalize macroprudential policies and to coordinate them with microprudential policies. Based on this analysis the conclusion is made about the absence of fundamental preconditions for preserving the status quo in relation to banking supervision by the Bank of Russia in the context of considerable costs of correcting its errors. There commendation to phase out seniorage financing of banking supervision is given.
About the Authors
Oleg V. Buklemishev
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
Dmitriy O. Vatolin
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
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For citations:
Buklemishev O.V., Vatolin D.O. Bank of Russia and bank supervision: Together forever? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2019;(10):85-98. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-10-85-98
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