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Contra pan-institutionalism. Part II
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-8-98-126
Abstract
The paper provides a critical assessment of pan-institutionalism — an approach which tries to explain the course of the world economic history by changes in formal economic and formal political institutions. The paper demonstrates methodological narrowness, conceptual inconsistency and historical inadequacy of pan-institutionalism. The second part of the article analyzes the historical ideas of pan-institutionalists and shows that this approach fails to provide a coherent explanation of the turning point of the world economic history — the Industrial revolution in England in the mid of XVIII century, i.e. a transition from Malthusian to Schumpeterian economic growth.
About the Author
Rostislav I. Kapeliushnikov
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS ; Centre for Labour Market Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Kapeliushnikov R.I. Contra pan-institutionalism. Part II. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2019;(8):98-126. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-8-98-126
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