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Niskanen model and actual expenses of Russian government institutions

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-8-85-97

Abstract

The Niskanen model of bureaucracy has found very limited use in Russia beyond the training courses, despite criticism aimed at the Russian government, administrative reform, and civil service reform. Meanwhile, the accumulated volume of data on the public expenditures allows us to test theoretical observations of the model empirically. The article proposes an assessment of the expenses of the institutions funded by the federal budget in 2005-2017 from the point of Niskanen’s theory. The data source is the laws on the execution of the federal budget, the subject of the analysis is the ability to increase expenditures (in comparable prices) by two times relative to the initial level. It has been found that changes in expenditures are in line with the assumption that bureaus are oriented toward absorbing public surplus by increasing their own budgets. At the same time, a restriction in demand was found essential, so the possibilities for expanding the budget are not fully utilized. Thus, the potential of basic models of bureaucratic behavior can be used in practice, for evaluation of the evolution of authorities government bodies and the effectiveness of budget expenditures.

About the Author

Alexey M. Kalinin
Business Solutons/SBS; National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation

Moscow



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For citations:


Kalinin A.M. Niskanen model and actual expenses of Russian government institutions. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2019;(8):85-97. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-8-85-97

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ISSN 0042-8736 (Print)