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От трансакционных издержек – к трансакционной ценности: преодолевая фрикционную парадигму
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81
Аннотация
В области изучения трансакционных издержек существует немало догматических концепций и утверждений, сохранившихся под влиянием зависимости от предшествующего развития. К ним относятся догма о трансакцион ных издержках как трениях, догма о непродуктивности трансакций как генератора потерь, Стиглерова версия теоремы Коуза и логика минимизации трансакционных издержек, догма о приоритетности институтов обеспечения низкозатратных трансакций. Перечисленные догмы лежат в основе сложившейся традиции трансакционного анализа — фрикционной парадигмы, которая составляет фундамент неоинституциональной теории. Поэтому сообщество новых институционалистов имплицитно блокирует попытки серьезно пересмотреть эту догматику. В статье обоснована альтернативная доминирующему институциональному дискурсу ценностноориентированная перспектива развития трансакционных исследований на основе возвращения, переосмысления и объединения теорий трансакций Дж. Коммонса, трансакционного сектора Дж. Уоллиса — Д. Норта, трансакционных выгод Т. Сэндлера, Н. Комзы, Т. Эггертссона и трансакционной ценности Э. Заяца — Ц. Олсена. Приводятся аргументы в пользу более широких объяснительных возможностей ценностно-ориентированного трансакционного анализа.
Ключевые слова
институты,
институциональная сложность,
трансакции,
трансакционные издержки,
трансакционные выгоды,
трансакционная ценность
JEL: A12, B41, B52
Об авторе
Д. П. Фролов
Волгоградский государственный технический университет
Россия
Фролов Даниил Петрович, д. э. н., проф. кафедры экономики и предпринимательства
Россия
Фролов Даниил Петрович, д. э. н., проф. кафедры экономики и предпринимательства
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При поддержке: Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке РФФИ (проект № 18-010-00832).
Для цитирования:
Фролов Д.П. От трансакционных издержек – к трансакционной ценности: преодолевая фрикционную парадигму. Вопросы экономики. 2020;(8):51-81. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81
For citation:
Frolov D.P. From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(8):51-81. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81
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