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On the methodology of institutional studies (To the 80th anniversary of Ronald Coase’s "Nature of the Firm")
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-8-96-119
Abstract
The paper deals with the comparative analysis of discrete institutional alternatives operationalized by referring to institutional design on different levels of interaction between economic agents and their groups. Theoretical differences between an institutional set of economic exchanges and an institutional boundaryof exchanges has been accounted for, as well as the differences between compensating and eliminating the failures of institutional arrangements used to organize economic exchange. Three examples illustrating the proposed research approach are analyzed: contracting on large diameter pipes for PJSC "Gazprom" infrastructure projects; contracting in the area of commercial real estate renting with "currency component"; the choice of mechanisms of governance for companies on highly concentrated markets with significant double-sided switching cost.
Keywords
discrete institutional alternatives,
market failures,
state failures,
market failures compensation,
market failures elimination,
contracts with a currency price component,
switching cost
JEL: B41, D02, D23, P23, P28
About the Author
A. Shastitko
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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For citations:
Shastitko A. On the methodology of institutional studies (To the 80th anniversary of Ronald Coase’s "Nature of the Firm"). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2016;(8):96-119. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-8-96-119
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