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Meso-institutions: Proliferating essences or evolving economic research programme?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-5-5-25
Abstract
The article discusses the foundations, opportunities and limitations of adjusting the conceptual framework of institutional analysis by replacing the pair “institutional environment — institutional agreements” with the triad “macro-, meso- and micro-institutions”. This study focuses on meso-institutions. It is expected that this concept is possible to fill the gap between the general institutional framework of economic exchange agents’ interaction and their decisions, which are reflected in contracts. Some examples from the competition policy and institutional design are offered, particularly the regulatory impact assessment methodology, to illustrate the role and place of meso-institutions in the structuring of public relations.
Keywords
meso-institution,
institutional environment,
institutional arrangement,
incomplete contract,
competition policy,
regulatory impact assessment
JEL: D02; K21; L40; L50
About the Author
Andrey E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Moscow
Russian Federation
Moscow
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For citations:
Shastitko A.E. Meso-institutions: Proliferating essences or evolving economic research programme? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2019;(5):5-25. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-5-5-25
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