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Еnforcement of Property Rights and Conractual Obligations
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-5-83-100
Abstract
The paper deals with theoretical approaches to the problems of property rights and contractual obligations and with analysis of economic consequences of the imperfect enforcement system. In particular, the authors consider Russian experience in the sphere of corporate conflicts. Legal and practical recommendations related to the improvement of legal framework, judiciary reform, executory process and different federal and regional authorities are also presented.
About the Authors
A. Radygin
Institute for the Economy in Transition
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
R. Entov
Institute for the Economy in Transition
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Radygin A., Entov R. Еnforcement of Property Rights and Conractual Obligations. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2003;(5):83-100. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-5-83-100
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