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Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2004-11-126-141
Abstract
By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.
About the Authors
A. Chernyavsky
Institute for Urban Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
K. Vartapetov
University of Oxford
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
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Review
For citations:
Chernyavsky A., Vartapetov K. Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2004;(11):126-141. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2004-11-126-141
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