

Томас Шеллинг, Роберт Ауман и теория интерактивных взаимодействий (Нобелевская премия 2005 г. по экономике)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-4-21
Аннотация
В статье рассмотрен вклад Т. Шеллинга и Р. Аумана - нобелевских лауреатов 2005 г. по экономике - в экономическую теорию и социальные науки в целом. Главные их научные достижения относятся к теории игр - мощному инструменту анализа взаимодействий индивидов и рационального поведения в широком контексте, от прикладной теории отраслевых рынков до экономики труда, социальной политики, международных отношений и политологии. Ауман и Шеллинг выступили первопроходцами в этой области, сформировав направление исследований, позволяющее расширить представления о рациональном поведении человека.
Об авторе
А. БелянинРоссия
доктор экономики, преподаватель МИЭФ ГУ-ВШЭ, научный сотрудник ИМЭМО РАН
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Белянин А. Томас Шеллинг, Роберт Ауман и теория интерактивных взаимодействий (Нобелевская премия 2005 г. по экономике). Вопросы экономики. 2006;(1):4-21. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-4-21
For citation:
Belyanin A. Thomas Schelling, Robert Aumann and Interactive Decision Theory (2005 Nobel Prize in Economics). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2006;(1):4-21. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-4-21