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Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-4-24
Abstract
How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler’s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies, where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.
About the Authors
S. Guriev
New Economic School; Centre for Economic and Financial Research
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
G. Egorov
Harvard University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
K. Sonin
New Economic School; Centre for Economic and Financial Research
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Guriev S., Egorov G., Sonin K. Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2007;(4):4-24. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-4-24
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