

Application of Economic Methods to the Сorruption Research
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-1-33-44
Abstract
The paper addresses the analysis of economic approaches to the corruption research. Essence and different kinds of corruption are considered from the economic point of view as well as the impact of corruption on social welfare. The author shows that it is impossible to clarify, whether corruption has a positive or a negative effect, because it may both reduce and increase social welfare. If the corruption causes under-consumption of the public good as compared with the situation of its absence, then there is real social loss in the total consumption. But corruption may also increase the volume of total consumption, therefore increasing social welfare.
References
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Review
For citations:
Epifanova N. Application of Economic Methods to the Сorruption Research. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2007;(1):33-44. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-1-33-44