

Направления и перспективы развития политико-экономических исследований
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-1-27-45
Аннотация
Статья представляет собой аналитический обзор основных направлений политико-экономического анализа, то есть направлений экономики и политологии, в рамках которых эндогенизируются политические процессы в экономических моделях и используются экономические методы для исследования политики. Анализируются разнообразные подходы к политико-экономическим исследованиям в различных сегментах научного сообщества: политическая экономика, эволюционная теория экономической политики, международная политическая экономия, формальная политология и теория экономической власти; рассматриваются основные методологические предпосылки, содержание и выводы позитивных исследований. Также рассматриваются особенности политико-экономического подхода в нормативных экономических исследованиях.
Об авторе
А. ЛибманРоссия
кандидат экономических наук, старший научный сотрудник ИЭ РАН, докторант Маннгеймского университета, сотрудник Центра российских исследований Восточно-Китайского университета
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Либман А. Направления и перспективы развития политико-экономических исследований. Вопросы экономики. 2008;(1):27-45. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-1-27-45
For citation:
Libman A. Directions and Perspectives of Political-Economic Studies. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2008;(1):27-45. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-1-27-45