

In Search of a New Methodology: Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis in the Work of Avner Greif
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-1-101-119
Abstract
In the past 20 years the ideas of A. Greif have drawn much attention among the Western economists and economic historians. In Russia, this perspective is rarely discussed. This paper attempts to fill the gap and review the methodology, the basic concepts and findings of Greif, as well as their impact on development in the field of institutional economics and economic history. Advantages and drawbacks of Greifs approach to the historical analysis of institutions are considered.
About the Author
N. DrozdovaRussian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Drozdova N. In Search of a New Methodology: Comparative and Historical Institutional Analysis in the Work of Avner Greif. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2011;(1):101-119. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-1-101-119