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Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2010-5-110-122
Abstract
The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.
About the Authors
S. Avdasheva
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
N. Dzagurova
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Avdasheva S., Dzagurova N. Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2010;(5):110-122. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2010-5-110-122
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