voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2010-1-82-98voprecotest-981Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYЗа пределами рынка: институты управления трансакциями в сложном мире (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2009 года - Оливер Уильямсон и Элинор Остром)Beyond Market: Institutions of Governance in the Complex World (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2009 - Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom)КузьминовЯ.KuzminovYa.

профессор, ректор

ЮдкевичМ.YudkevichM.

кандидат экономических наук, завлабораторией институционального анализа

Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation201020012010018298Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20102010Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/981

В работе представлен обзор основных направлений исследований Оливера Уильямсона и Элинор Остром - лауреатов Нобелевской премии по экономике 2009 г. Описывается вклад Уильямсона и Остром в понимание природы институтов и факторов выбора между институциональными альтернативами. Детально обсуждается роль, которую их работы сыграли в становлении современной институциональной теории, а также взаимосвязь идей Уильямсона и Остром с новейшими исследованиями в теории организаций, поведенческой экономике, экономике развития.

The article surveys the main lines of research conducted by Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom - 2009 Nobel Prize winners in economics. Williamsons and Ostroms contribution to understanding the nature of institutions and choice over institutional options are discussed. The role their work played in evolution of modern institutional economic theory is analyzed in detail, as well as interconnections between Williamsons and Ostroms ideas and the most recent research developments in organization theory, behavioral economics and development studies.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.