voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2009-12-83-99voprecotest-961Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYГраницы, конфликты и переговоры в федерациях и сообществах государствBorders, Conflicts and Bargaining in Federations and Communities of GovernmentsЛибманА.LibmanA.

кандидат экономических наук, доктор экономики (PhD), старший научный сотрудник ИЭ РАН, младший профессор Франкфуртской школы финансов, научный сотрудник Восточно-Китайского университета

Институт экономики РАНРоссияInstitute of Economics, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation2009201220090128399Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20092009Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/961

Экономическая политика в современном мире является своеобразной «равнодействующей» влияния множества территориальных центров государственной власти - на национальном, наднациональном и субнациональном уровнях. В экономической науке в последние десятилетия резко усилился интерес к анализу факторов, влияющих на распределение власти между этими центрами. В статье дается обзор двух основных исследовательских направлений в данной области: экономической теории конфликтов и теории эндогенной децентрализации. Рассматриваются базовые модели обоих подходов и варианты их модификации, использующиеся в литературе, а также факторы формирования конфликтов и переговоров по поводу деволюции.

Economic policy in the modern world can be treated as an outcome of interaction of multiple territorial centers of public authority: nation-states, subnational and supranational jurisdictions. In the last decades economics has increased its attention to the factors which influence the distribution of power among jurisdictions. The paper surveys two main research areas in this literature: economics of conflicts and theory of endogenous decentralization. It discusses the basic models of both approaches and their modifications applied in the literature as well as factors of conflict formation and bargaining over devolution.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.