voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2009-10-62-79voprecotest-934Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОТРАСЛЕВЫХ РЫНКОВINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONИнституциональные аспекты организации и функционирования мирового алмазного рынкаInstitutional Aspects of the International Diamond Market’s Organization and FunctioningЛевинМ.LevinМ.

доктор экономических наук, завкафедрой микроэконономического анализа факультета экономики

ШевелеваИ.ShevelevaI.

кандидат экономических наук, доцент

ГУ-ВШЭРоссияState University - Higher School of EconomicsRussian FederationАкадемия народного хозяйства при Правительстве РФРоссияAcademy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian FederationRussian Federation2009201020090106279Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20092009Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/934

В статье анализируется институциональная и структурная неоднородность мирового алмазного рынка. Рассматриваются рыночный уровень первичного предложения алмазов со стороны алмазодобывающих компаний, а также уровень перепродаж необработанных природных алмазов и производства бриллиантов. Показывается, что на первичном алмазном рынке сложилась олигополистическая структура, далее рынок функционирует как свободный конкурентный. На уровне сбыта алмазов проблема контрактной неполноты решается путем продажи алмазов комплектами, а на рынке перепродаж алмазов и производства бриллиантов — за счет этнически и социально гомогенных сетей, репутации.

The article analyzes the institutional and structural heterogeneity of international diamond market. Two market levels are considered: diamond primary supply (by mining companies) and the level of rough diamonds resales and polished diamonds manufacturing. It is shown that on the primary diamond market level the oligopoly structure has been established, and the secondary rough diamond market level is competitive. On the primary market level contractual commitments are enforced by "block booking sales"; on the level of rough diamonds resales and polished diamonds manufacturing — by social and ethnic homogeneous groups and networks as well as by reputation.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.