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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2009-8-43-53</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-907</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ISSUES OF THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Новая экономическая компаративистика: полемические заметки</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>A Critique of the New Comparative Economics</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Россер-мл.</surname><given-names>Дж. Б.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rosser-Jr.</surname><given-names>J. B.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>профессор</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Россер</surname><given-names>М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rosser</surname><given-names>M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>профессор</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Университет Джеймса Мэдисона</institution><country>Соединённые Штаты Америки</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>James Madison University</institution><country>United States</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2009</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>08</month><year>2009</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>8</issue><fpage>43</fpage><lpage>53</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2009</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2009</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/907">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/907</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье критикуется «новая экономическая компаративистика» и разработанная в ее рамках модель «границы институциональных возможностей» как инструмент сравнения эффективности экономических систем. Эта модель предполагает оптимизацию общественных издержек по поддержанию баланса между крайностями экономического беспорядка и диктатуры. Более адекватным и перспективным представляется альтернативный подход в формате «новой традиционной экономики» - эволюционный анализ институтов в контексте исторического развития экономических и внеэкономических норм и систем ценностей.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article critically examines the "new comparative economics" paradigm and its underlying model of the "institutional possibilities frontier" as an instrument of comparative efficiency analysis of economic systems. The model suggests a social costs minimization trade-off between economic disorder and dictatorship. But the alternative approach - that of the "new traditional economics" - is shown to be more adequate and promising. New traditional economics deals with the evolutionary analysis of institutions in the context of historical development of economic and non-economic norms and values.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>новая экономическая компаративистика</kwd><kwd>новый институционализм</kwd><kwd>граница институциональных возможностей</kwd><kwd>правовые истоки экономических систем</kwd><kwd>право и экономика</kwd><kwd>новая традиционная экономика</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>new comparative economics</kwd><kwd>new institutionalism</kwd><kwd>institutional possibilities frontier</kwd><kwd>legal origins of economic systems</kwd><kwd>law and economics</kwd><kwd>new traditional economics</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. N. 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