voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2012-6-48-64voprecotest-814Research ArticleИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКАINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICEРоль институтов доверия и контроля в неформальных денежных трансакцияхThe Role of Trust and Control Institutions in Informal Monetary TransactionsЛяскоА.LyaskoA.

доктор экономических наук, профессор

Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФРоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public AdministrationRussian Federation201220062012064864Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20122012Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/814

Вспомогательные институты не способны защитить доверительные ожидания экономических агентов по отношению к ликвидности денежных обязательств. Несмотря на этот вывод, можно назвать ряд форм денежных соглашений, в которых участники испытывают высокий уровень доверия к финансовым обязательствам своих партнеров. Длительность существования и постоянное воспроизведение этих соглашений как в развитой, так и в развивающейся экономической среде нуждаются в объяснении. Как показано в статье, возможный ответ на вопрос о предотвращении оппортунизма и нарушения обещаний в неформальных денежных трансакциях заключается в том, что вместо доверия интересы сторон в данных соглашениях эффективно защищены инструментами контроля. Степень контроля за деятельностью агентов в тесно связанных социальных и экономических сообществах может различаться, но институты контроля всегда замещают собой отношения доверия, чтобы гарантировать стабильность данного типа финансовых соглашений.

Auxiliary institutions fail to perform the function of protecting economic agents trust in the liquidity of various monetary obligations. Still, despite these conclusions, there exist some forms of monetary arrangements that seemingly demonstrate a high level of trust among their participants. The durability and continuous reproduction of these monetary arrangements in both developing markets and mature economies need to be explained. Part of this explanation has to address the question of trust arising among the parties to these financial transactions and its role in preventing opportunism and breach of promises made by their participants. As shown in this paper, a possible answer to this question might consist in the argument that the protective role of trust in these financial arrangements is replaced by the opposite norm of control over the agents behavior within close-knit social and economic communities. The degree of control may vary, but control always crowds out trust in order to add reliability to these financial setups.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.