voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2014-7-127-143voprecotest-665Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ТРУДА И СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ СФЕРЫLABOR AND SOCIAL ECONOMICSФакторы издержек защиты занятости для работодателей (эмпирическое исследование по межстрановой выборке предприятий)What Determines the Costs of EmploymentProtection Legislation for Employers? Evidence from Cross-country Enterprise SurveysМироненкоО. Н.MironenkoO.

к.  э.  н., старший преподаватель кафедры экономики труда и народонаселения, научный сотрудник Лаборатории исследований рынка труда НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

ol.mironenko@gmail.comНИУ ВШЭ (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation20142007201407127143Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20142014Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/665

В статье показано, от чего зависит величина издержек, которые несут работодатели в связи с исполнением требований законодательства о защите занятости. Эмпирическое исследование 50 тыс. предприятий из 93 стран за 2005-2011 гг. показало, что издержки защиты занятости, при прочих равных условиях, выше для крупных промышленных предприятий, находящихся в част ной собственности, и фирм, имеющих меньше возможностей не выполнять требования трудового законодательства. Кроме того, издержки возрастают с повышением уровня экономического развития страны, ужесточением регулирования найма временных работников и увеличением относительной минимальной заработной платы; издержки меньше в странах с социалистической и германской системой права по сравнению с государствами из англосаксонской правовой семьи.

The article examines the determinants of the costs incurred by employers while they fulfill the requirements of employment protection legislation. Using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys data from over 50,000 firms in 93 countries in 2005-2011 we verify that, ceteris paribus, these costs are higher for large, private, domestically owned firms in the manufacturing sector, as well as for those enterprises which are more covered by enforcement. With firm characteristics held constant, the costs of employment protection are significantly higher in more developed countries with stricter regulation of temporary employment and higher relative minimum wage, and are considerably less in countries with socialist and German legal systems than in the common law countries.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.