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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-4-26</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-639</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ТЕОРИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО ПОВЕДЕНИЯ: В ПОИСКАХ НОВОЙ ПАРАДИГМЫ</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Модели ограниченной рациональности: пути достижения интеллектуальной конкурентоспособности</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Bounded-rationality models:tasks to become intellectually competitive</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Харстад</surname><given-names>Р.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Harstad</surname><given-names>R. M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>профессор экономики университета Миссури (США)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">harstadr@missouri.edu</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Зельтен</surname><given-names>Р.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Selten</surname><given-names>R.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>лауреат Нобелевской премии в области экономики, профессор, научный координатор центра «Рациональность в свете результатов экспериментальных экономических исследований», университет Бонна (Германия)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">rselten@uni-bonn.de</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>университет Миссури (США)</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>University of Missouri (Columbia, MO, United States)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>университет Бонна (Германия)</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Academy Research Center “Rationality in the Light of Experimental Economic Results”, University of Bonn (Bonn, Germany)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2014</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>05</month><year>2014</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>4</fpage><lpage>26</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2014</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2014</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/639">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/639</self-uri><abstract><p>В исследованиях по экспериментальной экономике представлена целост-ная критика фундаментального положения неоклассической теории о том, что экономическим агентам свойственно оптимизационное поведение. За последние два десятилетия разработаны модели ограниченной рациональности, в которых предпринимается попытка уйти от оптимизационного подхода и привести анализ в соответствие с экспериментальными результатами. Тем не менее набор альтернативных моделей обозначает небольшое продвижение вперед и едва ли способен заменить основную парадигму. В статье выделены аспекты, в которых неоклассическая микроэкономика обладает неоспоримым и долгосрочным преимуществом перед моделями ограниченной рациональности, и на примерах показано, какие непростые изменения потребуются, чтобы эта ситуация изменилась. Одним из необходимых условий представляется более тесное взаимодействие теоретического моделирования и экспериментов.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize. The last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach, in ways consistent with experimental findings. Nonetheless, the collection of alternative models has made little headway supplanting the dominant paradigm. We delineate key ways in which neoclassical microeconomics holds continuing and compelling advantages over bounded-rationality models, and suggest, via a few examples, the sorts of further, difficult pushes that would be needed to redress this state of affairs. Closer collaboration between theoretic modeling and experiments is clearly seen to be necessary.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>эксперименты в экономике</kwd><kwd>ограниченная рациональ- ность</kwd><kwd>оптимизация</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>experiments in economics</kwd><kwd>bounded rationality</kwd><kwd>optimization</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Harstad R. M., Selten R. Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive // Journal of Economic Literature. 2013. Vol. 51, No 2. P. 496-511</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Harstad R. M., Selten R. Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive // Journal of Economic Literature. 2013. Vol. 51, No 2. 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