voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2014-4-99-122voprecotest-635Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYЭкономические модели мониторинга качества окружающей среды в условиях неполной информации и высоких издержекEconomic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high CostsЛевинМ. И.LevinM.

д. э. н., проф., завкафедрой микроэкономического анализа НИУ ВШЭ, завкафедрой микроэкономики РАНХиГС (Москва)

mlevin05@gmail.comМатросоваК. А.MatrosovaK.

преподаватель департамента теоретической экономики, аспирант НИУ ВШЭ; старший преподаватель факультета экономики РАНХиГС (Москва)

matrosova.k@gmail.comРАНХиГС (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian FederationНИУ ВШЭ; РАНХиГС (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation2014200420140499122Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20142014Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/635

В статье рассматривается мониторинг изменения качества окружающей среды как центральный элемент экологического регулирования. Мониторинг, как любой вид принципалагентских отношений, может провоцировать коррупционное поведение. Авторы анализируют необходимые для разработки эффективной системы природоохранных мероприятий экономические модели мониторинга окружающей среды с учетом неполной информации и высоких издержек.

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.