voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2014-3-126-140voprecotest-627Research ArticleИСТОРИЯ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИHISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHTВлияние законодательства о защите занятости на кадровую политику предприятий (Обзор теоретических моделейи результатов эмпирических исследований)The Effects of Employment Protection Legislationon Personnel Policies: A Review of Theoretical Modelsand Empirical ResultsМироненкоО. Н.MironenkoO.

к. э. н., старший преподаватель кафедры экономики труда и народонаселения, научный сотрудник Лаборатории исследований рынка труда НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

ol.mironenko@gmail.comНИУ ВШЭ (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation20142003201403126140Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20142014Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/627

Исполнение требований законодательства о защите занятости связано для работодателя с издержками. В статье представлен обзор работ, посвященных их влиянию на основные элементы кадровой политики предприятий: наем, увольнение, обучение и оплату труда. В условиях гибкой к понижению заработной платы или слабого правоприменения законодательство о защите занятости может не оказывать значимого влияния на поведение работодателей. В обратном случае сильная защита занятости может привести к сокращению масштабов найма и увольнений, изменению критериев отбора персонала, типов трудовых контрактов с работниками, порядка увольнений, а при определенных условиях - к росту инвестиций фирм в человеческий капитал и увеличению заработной платы.

Employers incur costs while fulfilling the requirements of employment protection legislation. The article contains a review of the core theoretical models and empirical results concerning the impact of these costs on firms’ practices in hiring, firing, training and remuneration. Overall, if wages are flexible or enforcement is weak, employment protection does not significantly influence employers’ behavior. Otherwise, stringent employment protection results in the reduction of hiring and firing rates, changes in personnel selection criteria, types of labour contracts and dismissal procedures, and, in some cases, it may lead to the growth of wages and firms’ investments to human capital.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.