voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2014-2-88-117voprecotest-616Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ИНСТИТУТЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКАECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICEИнвестиционный климат и сменяемостьвласти в российских регионахInvestment climate and government turnover in russian regionsСюняевГ. Р.SyunyaevG.

младший научный сотрудник лаборатории прикладного анализа институтов и социального капитала (ПрИиСК) НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

gsyunyaev@hse.ruПолищукЛ. И.PolishchukL.

профессор, заведующий ПрИиСК НИУ ВШЭ

lpolishchuk@hse.ruНИУ ВШЭ (Москва)РоссияLaboratory for Applied Analysis of Institutions and Social Capital, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation2014200220140288117Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20142014Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/616

В статье исследуется влияние ротации губернаторов и их аффилированности с частным сектором на качество инвестиционного климата в российских регионах. Представлена теоретическая модель, из которой следует, что совокупность названных факторов благотворно отражается на защите прав собственности при авторитарных режимах. Этот вывод подтверждается эмпирически с использованием российских региональных данных за 2002—2010 гг., когда прямые выборы губернаторов не проводились. Установлено, что при определенных предпосылках ротация власти полезна для экономического развития и при дефиците демократии.

We study the impact of Russian regional governors’ rotation and their affiliation with private sector firms for the quality of investment climate in Russian regions. A theoretical model presented in the paper predicts that these factors taken together improve “endogenous” property rights under authoritarian regimes. This conclusion is confirmed empirically by using Russian regional data for 2002—2010; early in that period gubernatorial elections had been canceled and replaced by federal government’s appointments. This is an indication that under certain conditions government rotation is beneficial for economic development even when democracy is suppressed.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.