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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2013-10-147-158</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-585</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Трудности финансовой реформы в США</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Difficulties of the Financial Reform in the USA</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Кулакова</surname><given-names>В. К.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kulakova</surname><given-names>V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>к.  полит.  н., научный сотрудник Центра североамериканских исследований Института мировой экономики и международных отношений РАН (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">kulakova@imemo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт мировой экономики и международных отношений РАН (Москва)</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS (Moscow, Russia)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2013</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>10</month><year>2013</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>10</issue><fpage>147</fpage><lpage>158</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2013</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2013</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/585">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/585</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье исследуется реформа финансового регулирования в США, инициированная законом Додда—Фрэнка о реформе финансового сектора и защите потребителя в 2010 г. Анализируются основные факторы, препятствующие успешному проведению финансово-экономической политики Б. Обамы: институциональные препятствия, внутриполитические игры и лоббизм, а также системные противоречия международного финансового регулирования. Также рассматриваются вопросы, которые возникают в экономической и политической науке в связи со сменой направления финансового регулирования, и оценивается степень радикальности реформы.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>We study the reform of financial regulation initiated by the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Major factors impeding Obama’s financial and economic policy are explored, including institutional difficulties, party warfare, lobbyism, and systemic inconsistencies of international financial regulation. We also examine challenges that are being faced by economic and political sciences due to the changes in financial regulation and also assess the level of radicality of the financial reform.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>финансовый кризис</kwd><kwd>финансовое регулирование</kwd><kwd>финансо- вая реформа</kwd><kwd>закон Додда—Фрэнка</kwd><kwd>международное финансовое регулирование</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>financial crisis</kwd><kwd>financial regulation</kwd><kwd>financial reform</kwd><kwd>Dodd— Frank Act</kwd><kwd>international financial regulation</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203, подписанный Б. Обамой 21 июля 2010 г</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Zhuravleva V.  Yu. (2011). 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