References

voprecotest

Вопросы экономики

Voprosy Ekonomiki

0042-8736

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

10.32609/0042-8736-2013-9-40-65

voprecotest-571

Research Article

ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ

ISSUES OF THEORY

Аутсорсинг институтов

Institutional Outsourcing

Полищук

Л. И.

Polishchuk

проф. НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

lpolishchuk@hse.ru

НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)Russian Federation

2013

20092013

094065

2013

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/571

С начала рыночных реформ и до настоящего времени институты в России формировались главным образом экономическими и политическими элитами, а общество в целом не было сколько-нибудь заметным участником этого процесса. Общественная эффективность такого «аутсорсинга» институтов зависит от того, в какой мере предпочтения элит соответствуют интересам и потребностям общества. Низкое качество российских институтов автор связывает с конфликтом интересов общества и неподконтрольных ему элит и делает вывод, что перспективы модернизации в России зависят от роста гражданской активности и превращения общества в реального субъекта институциональных преобразований.

Since the inception of market reforms until the present day Russian institutions have been shaped primarily by economic and political elites, with minimal involvement of the rest of the society in this process. Outcomes of such “institutional outsourcing” for the society depend on the affinity between elites’ preferences and societal needs. Low quality of Russian institutions is explained in the paper by a substantial conflict of interests between the society and unaccountable elites. Prospects of Russian modernization are thus contingent on the accumulation of civic culture and more effective representation of the society in the process of institutional change.

элитыинститутыпроблема коллективных действийпорядки открытого и ограниченного доступа

elitesinstitutionscollective action problemopen and limited access orders

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.