voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2026-3-5-24voprecotest-5703Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО СЕКТОРАPUBLIC ECONOMICSВебер vs. Нисканен? Связь типа бюрократии и характеристик российских госоргановWeber vs. Niskanen? The relationship between the model of bureaucracy and the characteristics of Russian government agencieshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9099-9847БорщевскийГ. А.BorshchevskiyG. A.

Борщевский Георгий Александрович, д. пол. н., государственный советник РФ, проф. РАНХиГС

Москва

Georgy A. Borshchevskiy

Moscow

borshchevskiy-ga@ranepa.ruРоссийская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФРоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public AdministrationRussian Federation20261103202603524Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20262026Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5703

М. Вебер полагал, что рациональная бюрократия свободна от экономи­ ческих интересов и влияний. Напротив, У. Нисканен утверждал, что высоко­ поставленные чиновники используют свое положение исключительно в целях максимизации полезности. Оценена взаимосвязь типа бюрократии и таких элементов производственной функции бюрократии, как численность и уровень оплаты труда государственных служащих, количество функций ведомств и объем бюджетных расходов. Исследование проведено на эмпи­ рических данных федеральных органов исполнительной власти за период 2016—2018 и 2024 гг. Предложена и апробирована методика идентификации типов бюрократии среди глав этих органов. Их биографические характе­ ристики соотнесены с тремя типами бюрократов: веберовским (кадровые чиновники), профессиональным (эксперты с отраслевым опытом) и поли­ тическим (партийные и иные активисты). В целом среди анализируемых руководителей преобладают веберовский (тенденция к росту) и в меньшей степени — политический (тенденция к снижению) типы. Выраженность профессионального типа находилась на уровне около 22—23% и почти не менялась. Кроме того, выяснилось, что модель максимизирующего бюро­ крата характерна для госслужбы современной России, так как даже в кри­ зисных условиях бюджетные расходы растут, что сопровождается ростом количества функций органов власти, численности федеральных чиновни­ ков и их зарплат. Сделан теоретически важный вывод, что веберовская бюрократия не противоположна нисканеновской: свой профессионализм она использует для максимизации функции полезности. Моделирование пока­ зало статистически значимое влияние типа бюрократа на характеристики и деятельность органов власти.

Max Weber believed that a rational bureaucracy is free from economic interests and influences, while William Niskanen argued that high-ranking officials used their positions to maximize own utility. In our paper we assess the relationship between the type of bureaucracy and such elements of the bureau­ cracy’s production function as the number of civil servants and the level of their salaries, the number of departmental functions, and the budget expenditures. We use data for federal executive bodies for the period 2016—2018 and 2024. A methodo­logy for identifying the types of bureaucracy is proposed and tested among the heads of federal executive bodies. Their biographies are correlated with three types of bureaucracy: Weberian (career officials), professional (experts with sectoral experience), and political (party and other activists). Overall, the analyzed leaders­ are characterized by the Weberian type (with an increasing trend) and, to a lesser extent, by the political type (with a decreasing trend). The prevalence of the professional type remained at approximately 22—23% and remained virtually­ unchanged. Furthermore, we have found that the maximizing bureaucrat model is characteristic of the civil service in the Russian Federation, as budget expenditures grow even during the crisis, accompanied by an increase in the scope of government functions, the number of federal officials, and their salaries. A theoretically significant conclusion is that Weberian bureaucracy is not the opposite of Niskanen theory: bureaucracy uses professionalism to maxi­ mize own utility function. Modeling has demonstrated statistically significant effects of the bureaucrat type on the characteristics and performance of govern­ ment agencies.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.