voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2026-1-42-65voprecotest-5524Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYПринцип предельного сдерживания в экономической теории преступления и наказанияThe principle of marginal deterrence in the economic theory of crime and punishmenthttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7943-8854КалягинГ. В.KalyaginGrigory V.

Калягин Григорий Владимирович, к. э. н., доцент кафедры прикладной институциональной экономики экономического факультета

Москва

Moscow

gkalyagin@yandex.ruМосковский государственный университет имени М.В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation202614012026014265Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20262026Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5524

Проанализирован один из ключевых принципов оптимального правоприменения в экономической теории преступления и наказания — принцип предельного сдерживания. Несмотря на его важность для организации эффективной борьбы с преступностью, консенсусного понимания нет даже на теоретическом уровне, что делает затруднительной эмпирическую проверку эффективности предельного сдерживания. Подробно рассмотрены альтернативные подходы исследователей к пониманию данного принципа, а также влияние, которое оказывает различное его понимание на оптимальную политику общественного правоприменения и сдерживания преступности. Предложена оригинальная модель предельного сдерживания, заполняющая заметную теоретическую лакуну: преступления, между которыми выбирает потенциальный правонарушитель, отличаются друг от друга не доходами, которые они могут ему принести, а вероятностью для него избежать наказания. Основной вывод: тяжесть наказания за преступление, вероятность разоблачения которого выше, при общем правоприменении не только имеет внутренний оптимум, но, скорее всего, этот оптимум будет ниже традиционного (в тех случаях, когда он существует ), в отличие от решения, при котором оптимальная тяжесть наказания равна размеру причиненного обществу ущерба, деленному на вероятность наказания. Этот результат сохраняется в том числе для случаев, когда общественный ущерб от преступления с меньшей вероятностью разоблачения и наказания преступника не превышает аналогичный ущерб для  альтернативного преступления, характеризующегося большей вероятностью разоблачения.

This article is devoted to the analysis of one of the key principles of optimal law enforcement in the economic theory of crime and punishment — the principle of marginal deterrence. Despite its importance of for organizing an effective fight against crime, there is no consensus understanding of it even at the theoretical level, which makes it difficult to empirically test the effectiveness of marginal deterrence. Here we consider in detail alternative approaches of researchers to understanding this principle, as well as the impact that different understandings have on the optimal policy of public law enforcement and crime deterrence. In this article, we also propose an original model of marginal deterrence that fills a noticeable theoretical gap: the crimes between which a potential offender chooses in our model differ from each other not in the income they can bring him, but in the probability for him to avoid punishment. The main conclusion: the severity of punishment for a crime with a higher probability of detection, in general law enforcement, not only has an internal optimum, but most likely this optimum will be lower than the traditional solution for cases where it exists, in which the optimal severity of punishment is equal to the amount of damage caused to society by the offense, divided by the probability of punishment. This result also holds for cases where the social damage from a crime with a lower probability of detection and punishment of the offender does not exceed the similar damage for an alternative crime characterized by a higher probability of detection.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.