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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2013-7-4-28</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-552</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВЫЗОВЫ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>CHALLENGES OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Механизмы глобального регулирования: экономический анализ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Mechanisms of Global Governance: Economic Analysis</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Григорьев</surname><given-names>Л. М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Grigoryev</surname><given-names>L.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>к.э.н., ординарный профессор, завкафедрой мировой экономики факультета мировой экономики и мировой политики НИУ ВШЭ, председатель Правления российской организации Всемирного фонда природы (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">lgrigor1@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Курдин</surname><given-names>А. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kurdin</surname><given-names>A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>к. э.н., доцент кафедры мировой экономики факультета мировой экономики и мировой политики НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">aakurdin@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia); WWF-Russia, Chairman of the Board (Moscow, Russia)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2013</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>07</month><year>2013</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>7</issue><fpage>4</fpage><lpage>28</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2013</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2013</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/552">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/552</self-uri><abstract><p>Координация экономической деятельности на глобальном уровне осуществляется с помощью разнообразных механизмов регулирования действий компаний, государств и международных организаций. Несмотря на разнородность сложившихся механизмов регулирования в разных сферах, их можно систематизировать на основе ряда ключевых параметров, в частности характера распределения прав собственности, механизмов управления трансакциями и распространения институтов. Этот подход позволяет не только классифицировать существующие институты, но и проектировать новые. Обострение глобальных проблем в современную эпоху может потребовать пересмотра механизмов глобального регулирования. Авторы предлагают единый подход (универсальную структуру) для осмысления этой задачи, что поможет решить ее в будущем.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The coordination of economic activity at the global level is carried out through different mechanisms, which regulate activities of companies, states, international organizations. In spite of wide diversity of entrenched mechanisms of governance in different areas, they can be classified on the basis of key characteristics, including distribution of property rights, mechanisms of governance (in the narrow sense according to O. Williamson), mechanisms of expansion. This approach can contribute not only to classifying existing institutions but also to designing new ones. The modern aggravation of global problems may require rethinking mechanisms of global governance. The authors offer the universal framework for considering this problem and its possible solutions.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>глобальное регулирование</kwd><kwd>глобальное управление</kwd><kwd>механизмы управления трансакциями</kwd><kwd>глобальные проблемы</kwd><kwd>глобальные внешние эффекты</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>global governance</kwd><kwd>mechanisms of governance</kwd><kwd>global problems</kwd><kwd>global externalities</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Аузан А. (ред.) (2011). Новая институциональная экономическая теория. М.: ИНФРА-М. 2-е изд.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Auzan A. (ed.) (2011). New Institutional Economic Theory. 2nd ed. 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