voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2025-11-122-142voprecotest-5516Research ArticleМИКРОЭКОНОМИКАMICROECONOMICSЭкономика медиации в контрактных отношениях: от доброй ссоры к хрупкому мируThe economics of mediation in contractual relationships: From a fat lawsuit to a lean agreementhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9416-4086ПавловаН. С.PavlovaN. S.

Павлова Наталья Сергеевна - к. э. н., с. н. с. Центра исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС, с. н. с. кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета МГУ.

Москва

Natalia S. Pavlova - PhD in Ec., Senior Researcher, Center for Research in Competition and Economic Regulation RANEPA, Senior Researcher, Competition and Industrial Policy Dept., Faculty of Economics Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Moscow

pavl.ns@yandex.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2155-9837ФедоровС. И.FedorovS. I.

Федоров Сергей Игоревич - к. э. н., м. н. с. Центра исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС, ассистент кафедры конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета МГУ.

Москва

Sergei I. Fedorov - PhD in Ec., Junior Researcher, Center for Research in Competition and Economic Regulation RANEPA, Assistant, Competition and Industrial Policy Dept., Faculty of Economics Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Moscow

fedoroffsi@yandex.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6713-069XШаститкоА. Е.ShastitkoA. E.

Шаститко Андрей Евгеньевич - д. э. н., проф., завкафедрой конкурентной и промышленной политики экономического факультета МГУ, директор Центра исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС.

Москва

Andrey E. Shastitko - Dr. in Ec., Director, Center for Research in Competition and Economic Regulation RANEPA, Assistant, Head of Competition and Industrial Policy Dept., Faculty of Economics Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Moscow

aes99@yandex.ruРоссийская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ; Московский государственный университет имени М.В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public AdministrationRussian Federation202507112025011122142Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20252025Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5516

Действенные механизмы урегулирования споров и поддержание контрактных отношений в добровольных обменах — важный инструмент повышения благосостояния экономических агентов в условиях рисков и фактического возникновения конфликтных ситуаций по поводу ограниченных ресурсов. Оказывать помощь в разрешении конфликтов, при этом не участвуя в принятии решений, призван медиатор. Привлечение такого посредника к урегулированию хозяйственных споров стало распространенным явлением, его популярность растет в рамках альтернативных способов их урегулирования (ADR). На основе применения концептуального ядра экономической теории трансакционных издержек предложено объяснение экономических оснований и возможностей применения медиации в хозяйственных спорах. Объяснено отличие медиации от вовлечения в трансакции третьей стороны (трехстороннего механизма управления трансакциями), а также почему медиация наиболее уместна и востребована для поддержания гибридных институциональных соглашений. Продемонстрированы отличия медиатора от арбитра, консультанта и регулятора. Раскрыт механизм информационного обмена между сторонами конфликта с участием медиатора. Наряду с применением инструментария экономической теории трансакционных издержек в объяснении экономических оснований медиации рассмотрена принудительная медиация как один из альтернативных способов урегулирования конфликтов, продемонстрированы его возможности и недостатки. Обозначены направления дальнейших исследований новой предметной области в свете экономической теории трансакционных издержек и теории управления поведением исполнителя, идентифицированы проблемы, связанные с применением медиатора в качестве инструмента разрешения конфликтных ситуаций в сфере антимонопольного правоприменения.

Effective mechanisms for dispute resolution and the maintenance of contractual relations in voluntary exchanges are an important means of improving the welfare of economic agents under conditions of risk and actual conflicts over limited resources. A mediator is called upon to assist in resolving such conflicts without directly participating in decision-making. The involvement of mediators in the settlement of business disputes has become increasingly common and continues to gain popularity within the framework of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Building on the conceptual core of transaction cost economics, the paper explains the economic rationale and scope of mediation in business disputes. It clarifies how mediation differs from the involvement of a third party in transactions (a tripartite transaction governance mechanism) and why it is particularly suitable for supporting hybrid institutional arrangements. Applying the conceptual framework of transaction cost theory makes it possible to identify the functions of mediation and the mediator in contractual relations through two key aspects — contract incompleteness and information asymmetry. The differences between a mediator and an arbitrator, consultant, and regulator are highlighted, and the mechanics of information exchange between the parties with the mediator’s participation are described. In addition to applying the analytical tools of transaction cost economics to explain the economic foundations of mediation, the novelty of the study lies in a detailed analysis of mandatory (forced) mediation as one of the alternative methods of conflict resolution. The paper demonstrates both the advantages and limitations of this approach. Finally, it outlines directions for further research in this emerging field within the frameworks of transaction cost economics and the theory of executive behavior management, identifying several issues related to the use of mediation as a tool for resolving conflicts in antitrust enforcement.

гибридные институциональные соглашениямеханизм ценмеханизмы управления трансакциямитрансакционные издержкирассеянное знаниенеявное знаниеhybrid arrangementsprice mechanismmechanisms of governancetransaction costdispersed knowledgetacit knowledgeСтатья подготовлена в рамках государственного задания Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации (РАНХиГС)The article was prepared as part of the state assignment of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).ReferencesАвдашева С. Б., Шаститко А. Е. (2015). Предмет обвинения: время объявления имеет значение // Экономическая политика. № 1. С. 72—91.Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A. E. (2015). Alleged infringement: The time of announcement does matter. Ekonomicheskaya Politika, No. 1, pp. 72—91. (In Russian).Морозова Т. (2022). Как медиатору проверить условия медиативного соглашения на реальность и исполнимость? // Медиатор.РФ. № 4. С. 120—125.Morozova T. (2022). How a mediator can check the conditions of a mediation agreement for reality and enforceability? Mediator.RF, No. 4, pp. 120—125. (In Russian).Уильямсон О. (1996). Экономические институты капитализма: фирмы, рынки, «отношенческая» контрактация. СПб.: Лениздат.The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, and relational contracting. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat. (In Russian).Шаститко А. Е. (2011). Ошибки I и II рода в экономических обменах с участием третьей стороны-гаранта // Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации. № 10. С. 125—148.Shastitko A. E. (2011). Type I and II errors in economic exchanges involving a third­party guarantor. Journal of the New Economic Association, No. 10, pp. 125—148. (In Russian).Шаститко А. Е. (2013). Экономические эффекты ошибок в правоприменении и правоустановлении. М.: Дело.Shastitko A. E. (2013). The economic effects of errors in law enforcement and law making. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian).Шаститко А. Е. (2022). Достоверность обязательств в контрактных отношениях: где пределы возможного? // Управленец. Т. 13, № 2. С. 20—33. https://doi.org/10.29141/2218-5003-2022-13-2-2Shastitko A. E. (2022). Credible commitments in contract relations: Where are the limits of the possible? Upravlenets/The Manager, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 20—33. (In Russian).] https://doi.org/10.29141/2218­5003­2022­13­2­2Шаститко А. Е. (2024). Новая институциональная экономическая теория. 5-е изд. М.: МАКС Пресс.Shastitko A. E. (2024). New institutional economics. 5th ed. Moscow: MAKS Press. (In Russian).Шаститко А. Е., Павлова Н. С. (2017). Антитраст в условиях двусторонней монополии // Вопросы экономики. № 8. С. 75—91. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-8-75-91Shastitko A. E., Pavlova N. S. (2017). Antitrust in bilateral monopoly. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, pp. 75—91. (In Russian).] https://doi.org/10.32609/0042­8736­2017­8­75­91Шаститко А. Е., Павлова Н. С. (2025). Медиация сквозь линзу экономической теории трансакционных издержек: предметное поле проблемы и выводы для политики // Вопросы теоретической экономики. № 2. С. 7—21. https://doi.org/10.52342/2587-7666VTE_2025_2_7_21Shastitko A. E., Pavlova N. S. (2025). Mediation through the lens of transaction cost economics: Subject field and policy implications. Voprosy Teoreticheskoy Ekonomiki, No. 2, pp. 7—21. (In Russian). https://doi.org/10.52342/2587­7666VTE_2025_2_7_21Arrow K. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 941—973.Arrow K. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 941—973.Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A. E. (2018). Depreciating evidence in administrative adjudication: Rules on the sequence to present evidence. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 496—510. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2018.401Avdasheva S. B., Shastitko A. E. (2018). Depreciating evidence in administrative adjudication: Rules on the sequence to present evidence. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 496—510. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2018.401Balzer B., Schneider J. (2021). Managing a conflict: Оptimal alternative dispute resolution. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 415—445. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12374Balzer B., Schneider J. (2021). Managing a conflict: Оptimal alternative dispute resolution. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 415—445. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12374Brown J. G., Ayres I. (1994). Economic rationales for mediation. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 323—402. https://doi.org/10.2307/1073526Brown J. G., Ayres I. (1994). Economic rationales for mediation. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 323—402. https://doi.org/10.2307/1073526Buchanan J. (1999). Logical foundations of constitutional liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Buchanan J. (1999). Logical foundations of constitutional liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Grossman S., Hart O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691—719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404Grossman S., Hart O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691—719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404Hart O. (1995). Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Hart O. (1995). Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Hart O., Moore J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, pp. 1119—1158. https://doi.org/10.1086/261729Hart O., Moore J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, pp. 1119—1158. https://doi.org/10.1086/261729Hayek F. von. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 519—553.Hayek F. von. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 519—553.Joskow P. L. (2002). Transaction cost economics, antitrust rules and remedies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 95—116. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.95Joskow P. L. (2002). Transaction cost economics, antitrust rules and remedies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 95—116. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.95Künneke R., Groenewegen J., Ménard C. (2010) Aligning modes of organization with technology: Critical transactions in the reform of infrastructures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 494—505. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.009Künneke R., Groenewegen J., Ménard C. (2010) Aligning modes of organization with technology: Critical transactions in the reform of infrastructures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 494—505. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.009McNamara P. (2019). Mandatory and quasi-mandatory mediation. Australian Bar Review, Vol. 47, pp. 215—245.McNamara P. (2019). Mandatory and quasi-mandatory mediation. Australian Bar Review, Vol. 47, pp. 215—245.Ménard C. (2004). The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, No. 3, pp. 345—376. https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456041960605Ménard C. (2004). The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, No. 3, pp. 345—376. https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456041960605Ménard C. (2022). Hybrids: where are we? Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 297—312. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137421000230Ménard C. (2022). Hybrids: where are we? Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 297—312. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137421000230NADRAC (2009). The resolve to resolve: Embracing ADR to improve access to justice in the federal jurisdiction. A report to the Attorney-General. National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council.NADRAC (2009). The resolve to resolve: Embracing ADR to improve access to justice in the federal jurisdiction. A report to the Attorney-General. National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council.Niskanen W. A. (1968). Nonmarket decision making: The peculiar economics of bureaucracy. American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 293—305.Niskanen W. A. (1968). Nonmarket decision making: The peculiar economics of bureaucracy. American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 293—305.Polanyi M. (1967). The tacit dimension. New York: Anchor Books.Polanyi M. (1967). The tacit dimension. New York: Anchor Books.Quek D. (2010). Mandatory mediation: An oxymoron — Examining the feasibility of implementing a court-mandated mediation program. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 479—510.Quek D. (2010). Mandatory mediation: An oxymoron — Examining the feasibility of implementing a court-mandated mediation program. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 479—510.Shastitko A., Ménard C. (2017). Discrete institutional alternatives: Theoretical and policy issues (Celebrating the 80th anniversary of Ronald Coase’s “Nature of the Firm”). Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 200—220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2017.06.005Shastitko A., Ménard C. (2017). Discrete institutional alternatives: Theoretical and policy issues (Celebrating the 80th anniversary of Ronald Coase’s “Nature of the Firm”). Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 200—220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2017.06.005Shastitko A., Ménard C., Pavlova N. (2018). The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless? Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 175—196. https://doi.org/10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031Shastitko A., Ménard C., Pavlova N. (2018). The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless? Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 175—196. https://doi.org/10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031Shavell S. (1995). Alternative dispute resolution: An economic analysis. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1—28. https://doi.org/10.1086/467950Shavell S. (1995). Alternative dispute resolution: An economic analysis. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1—28. https://doi.org/10.1086/467950Sunstein C. R. (2021). Sludge: What stops us from getting things done and what to do about it. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/13859.001.0001Sunstein C. R. (2021). Sludge: What stops us from getting things done and what to do about it. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/13859.001.0001Thaler R. H., Sunstein C. R. (2008). Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Thaler R. H., Sunstein C. R. (2008). Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Toda A. A., Walsh K. J. (2017). Edgeworth box economics with multiple equilibria. Economic Theory Bulletin, Vol. 5, pp. 65—80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505016-0102-3Toda A. A., Walsh K. J. (2017). Edgeworth box economics with multiple equilibria. Economic Theory Bulletin, Vol. 5, pp. 65—80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505016-0102-3Tullock G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.Tullock G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.Williamson O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.Williamson O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.Williamson O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 269—296. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393356Williamson O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 269—296. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393356Zimmer D., Höft J. (2013). Alternative dispute resolution in antitrust cases? On the role of mediation in US antitrust and EU and German competition law. European Competition Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 434—442.Zimmer D., Höft J. (2013). Alternative dispute resolution in antitrust cases? On the role of mediation in US antitrust and EU and German competition law. European Competition Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 434—442.Zywicki T. J., Boettke P. (eds.) (2017). Research handbook on Austrian law and economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788113106Zywicki T. J., Boettke P. (eds.) (2017). Research handbook on Austrian law and economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788113106

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.