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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2025-5-5-45</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-5261</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ISSUES OF THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Искусственный интеллект и проблема сингулярности в экономике</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Artificial intelligence and the problem of siguilarity in economics</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2312-2110</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Капелюшников</surname><given-names>Р. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kapeliushnikov</surname><given-names>R. I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Капелюшников Ростислав Исаакович, чл.-корр. РАН, д. э. н., гл. н. с. ИМЭМО РАН, замдиректора Центра трудовых исследований НИУ ВШЭ</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Rostislav I. Kapeliushnikov</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">rostis@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский институт мировой экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова; &#13;
Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS;&#13;
HSE University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>17</day><month>05</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>5</fpage><lpage>45</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5261">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5261</self-uri><abstract><p>В последние годы в связи с развитием технологии искусственного интеллекта (ИИ) важное место в исследованиях по экономическому росту заняло обсуждение проблемы сингулярности. Многие ожидают, что уже в ближайшие десятилетия ИИ сможет достичь уровня человеческого интеллекта и взять на себя выполнение всех или большей части задач, выполняемых сегодня людьми. Это обеспечит переход экономики в режим сингулярности с непрерывно ускоряющимися темпами роста (в пределе — стремящимися к бесконечности). По оценкам, благодаря внедрению ИИ темпы экономического роста возрастут на порядок — с нынешних 2—3% до беспрецедентных 20—30%. Подробно рассматриваются аргументы  как  за, так и против такого сверхоптимистического сценария. Аргументация в его пользу исходит из ключевой посылки моделей эндогенного роста о том, что конечным источником экономического роста выступают идеи (научные и технологические знания). Главный теоретический контраргумент связан с так называемой «болезнью издержек Баумоля», когда со временем вклад в ВВП секторов с самыми высокими темпами роста производительности последовательно уменьшается. Основной эмпирический контраргумент сводится к тому, что если бы сингулярность была рядом, то первые признаки ее приближения были бы видны уже сегодня по необычному поведению ключевых макроэкономических показателей. Отсюда сделан вывод, что даже если взрывной рост и станет когда-либо реальностью, то, по-видимому, очень нескоро.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the problem of singularity has taken an important place in new studies on economic growth. Many expect that in the coming decades, AI will be able to reach the level of human intelligence and take over all or most of the tasks performed by people today. This will cause an economic growth explosion so that economy could transit into a singularity regime with superexponential growth rates (in the limit, approaching to infinity). The paper examines in detail the arguments both for and against such an over-optimistic scenario. The arguments in its favor are based on the key assumption of endogenous growth models that the ultimate source of economic growth is ideas (scientific and technological knowledge). The basic theoretical counterargument refers to the so-called “Baumol cost disease”, whereby over time the contribution to GDP of sectors with the fastest productivity dynamics steadily decreases. The main empirical counterargument is that if the singularity were already near, the first signs of it would be visible in an unusual behavior of some key macroeconomic parameters. This implies that even if explosive growth ever become a reality, it would happen not soon.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>автоматизация</kwd><kwd>болезнь Баумоля</kwd><kwd>искусственный интеллект</kwd><kwd>сингулярность</kwd><kwd>экономический рост</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>automation</kwd><kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd><kwd>Baumol cost disease</kwd><kwd>economic growth</kwd><kwd>singularitye</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Abdih Y., Joutz F. (2005). Relating the knowledge production function to total factor productivity: An endogenous growth puzzle. IMF Working Paper, No. 05/74. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451860931.001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Abdih Y., Joutz F. (2005). Relating the knowledge production function to total factor productivity: An endogenous growth puzzle. 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