voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2025-1-32-43voprecotest-5235Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYИнституциональный фундамент долгосрочного экономического развития (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2024 года)Institutional fundamentals of long-run economic development (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2024)https://orcid.org/0009-0006-8835-9094ЕгоровГ. В.EgorovG. V.

Егоров Георгий Владимирович, Ph.D. (Econ.), проф.,

Эванстон, Иллинойс.

Georgy V. Egorov,

Evanston, IL.

g-egorov@kellogg.northwestern.eduСеверо-Западный университет, Школа управления КеллоггСоединённые Штаты АмерикиKellogg School of Management, Northwestern UniversityUnited States202507012025013243Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20252025Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5235

Нобелевская премия по экономике 2024 г. присуждена Дарону Асемоглу и Саймону Джонсону из МТИ, а также Джеймсу Робинсону из Чикагского университета за фундаментальные исследования в области институциональной экономики. Лауреаты и их последователи предложили теоретические модели институциональной динамики, на основе которых возникли целые области современной экономической науки. Асемоглу, Джонсон и Робинсон внесли значительный вклад в эмпирические исследования долгосрочного экономического развития, установив важнейшие закономерности, связывающие экономическое развитие с политическими и социальными институтами.

2024 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson from MIT and to James Robinson from the University of Chicago for fundamental contributions to institutional economics. The laureates and their followers have suggested a number of theoretical models of institutional dynamics, giving rise to new areas of modern economic research. In addition, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson have made major contributions to empirical studies of long-term economic development by establishing critical patterns that connect economic development with political and social institutions.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.