voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2015-2-69-103voprecotest-52Research ArticleИНСТИТУТЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКАИзмерение институтов в российских регионах: методология, источникиданных, анализMeasuring Institutions in russian regions: Methodology, Sources of data, AnalysisБарановА. Ю.BaranovA.

аналитик Международного центра изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

noemail@neicon.ruМалковЕ. С.MalkovE.

младший научный сотрудник научно-учебной лаборатории макроэкономического анализа НИУ ВШЭ

noemail@neicon.ruПолищукЛ. И.PolishchukL.

к.э.н., проф. факультета экономики, заведующий научно-учебной лабораторией прикладного анализа институтов и социального капитала НИУ ВШЭ

lpolishchuk@hse.ruРохлицМ.RochlitzM.

доцент департамента социальных наук НИУ ВШЭ

noemail@neicon.ruСюняевГ. Р.SyunyaevG.

аспирант департамента политической науки Колумбийского университета (Нью-Йорк, США) и НИУ ВШЭ

noemail@neicon.ruНИУ ВШЭ (Москва)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian FederationНИУ ВШЭ (Москва); Колумбийский университет (Нью-Йорк, США)Соединённые Штаты АмерикиNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsUnited States2015200220150269103Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20152015Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/52

В статье анализируются и сопоставляются различные индексы качества институтов в российских регионах. Сделан вывод, что региональные институты принципиально «многомерны», в связи с чем сравнение регионов с точки зрения институционального климата в целом может оказаться проблематичным. Предложены новые институциональные индикаторы, рассчитанные с использованием данных опроса российских предприятий в проекте BEEPS Европейского банка реконструкции и развития. С помощью новых индикаторов получена типология российских регионов в зависимости от того, в какой степени региональные администрации контролируют политический процесс и экономику подведомственных территорий. Исследована динамика индексов региональных институтов на фоне общероссийских институциональных трендов.

The paper explores various measures of institutional quality in Russian regions, and compares those measures to each other. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that Russian regional institutions are essentially multidimensional, and therefore comparisons of Russian regions in terms of their overall institutional quality could be problematic. New institutional indexes are derived from Russian enterprise surveys held under the BEEPS project of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Such indexes yield a typology of Russian regions in terms of efficacy of regional administrations’ control over economy and bureaucracy in their regions. Dynamics of regional institutional indexes is investigated against the backdrop of Russia-wide institutional trends.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.