voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2025-3-29-47voprecotest-5108Research ArticleМЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЭКОНОМИКАINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICSОценка влияния экспортных и импортных санкций на российскую экономику с использованием таблиц «затраты- выпуск»The input—output analysis of the impact of trade sanctions on the Russian economyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7060-3574ЧернявскийА. В.CherniavskyA. V.

Чернявский Андрей Васильевич, к. э. н., вед. н. с. Института«Центр развития» НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Andrey V. Cherniavsky

Moscow

Acherniavsky@hse.ruЧепельА. А.ChepelA. A.

Чепель Алена Алексеевна, эксперт Института «Центр развития» НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Alena A. Chepel

Moscow

alena.a.che@gmail.comНациональный Исследовательский Университет "Высшая Школа Экономики"РоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation202502032025032947Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20252025Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5108

Российская экономика функционирует в условиях санкций и контрсанкций, введенных с февраля 2022 г. Их эффект оказался заметно слабее первоначальных оценок. Проанализировано влияние торговых санкций на экономику России с использованием данных таблиц «затраты—выпуск», позволяющих включить в анализ эффекты межотраслевых связей, в сочетании с эконометрическими инструментами; экспортные и импортные санкции рассматриваются отдельно. Эффект экспортных санкций анализируется на основе потенциального сокращения государственного спроса, что вызывает снижение не только нефтегазовых, но и ненефтегазовых доходов консолидированного бюджета. Дополнительно включены в анализ расчеты изменения выпуска в ответ на сокращение промежуточного импорта на базе эконометрических моделей. Рассмотрены эффекты импортозамещения конечной продукции с учетом потенциального увеличения спроса на промежуточный импорт. Импортные ограничения преодолеваются в значительной степени за счет переформатирования бизнеса, изменения страновой структуры импорта и структуры производства внутри укрупненных видов продукции. 

The Russian economy operates under the constraints of sanctions and countersanctions introduced since February 2022. Their impact has been significantly weaker than initially anticipated. This article examines the influence of trade sanctions on Russia’s economy using input—output tables, which allow for the inclusion of intersectoral linkages in the analysis, combined with econometric tools. Export and import sanctions are considered separately. The effect of export sanctions is analyzed basing on the potential reduction in government demand, which leads to a decline in both oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas revenues of the consolidated budget. We expand our approach by including calculations of output changes in response to reduced intermediate imports, derived from econometric models. The article also examines the effects of import substitution of final goods in the economy, accounting for the potential increase in demand for intermediate imports. Import restrictions are largely overcome by business restructuring, changes in the structure of imports by country, and shifts in the structure of production within broad product categories. 

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.