voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2025-8-70-101voprecotest-4946Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОТРАСЛЕВЫХ РЫНКОВINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONИзмерение рыночной власти российских энергетических компаний на основе их операционных и финансовых результатовMeasuring the market power of Russian energy companies based on their operating and financial resultshttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1095-0803АйзенбергН. И.AizenbergN. I.

Айзенберг Наталья Ильинична - к. э. н., доцент, с. н. с. ИСЭМ СО РАН.

Иркутск

Natalia I. Aizenberg

Irkutsk

zen@isem.irk.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9651-3158ДзюбаС. А.DzubaS. A.

Дзюба Сергей Ануфриевич - д. э. н., проф. Школы экономики и менеджмента ДВФУ.

Владивосток

Sergey A. Dzuba

Vladivostok

dfirk@mail.ruИнститут систем энергетики имени Л.А. Мелентьева СО РАНРоссияMelentiev Energy Systems Institute of Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian FederationДальневосточный федеральный университетРоссияFar Eastern Federal UniversityRussian Federation2025140820250870101Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20252025Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4946

По результатам реформы электроэнергетики России 2000-х годов сформирован российский рынок электроэнергии, где в сфере производства действуют крупные генерирующие компании. Олигополистические отношения могут снизить общественную эффективность рыночного механизма. Задача выявления признаков проявления рыночной власти не имеет однозначного и общепринятого решения. Предлагается подход к ее решению, основанный на анализе многолетней динамики топливных издержек и связанных показателей. Он позволяет говорить о наличии признаков рыночной власти для компаний, обеспечивающих около четверти генерации электроэнергии. При этом замеченные проявления не связаны с размером компаний, с наличием или отсутствием когенерации. Выявлена общая тенденция к снижению проявления рыночной власти компаний за последние годы. Кроме того, отмечено падение конкурентоспособности компаний, владеющих генерирующими мощностями, специализирующимися только на электроэнергии, по сравнению с компаниями с когенерирующими мощностями, что скорее всего является следствием специфической структуры российского рынка электроэнергии и тепла.

As a result of the reform of the Russian electric power industry in the 2000s, the Russian electricity market was formed, where large generating companies operate in the production sector. Oligopolistic relations can reduce the social efficiency of the market mechanism. The task of identifying signs of manifestation of market power does not have a clear and generally accepted solution. In this article, the authors propose an approach to solving it, based on the analysis of the dynamics of fuel costs over several years. It allows us to assert that there are signs of market power for companies that provide about a quarter of electricity generation. At the same time, the observed manifestations are not related to the size of the companies, the presence or absence of cogeneration. A general trend towards a decrease in the market power of companies over the past few years has been identified. In addition, there has been a decline in the competitiveness of companies owning generating capacities specializing only in electricity compared to companies with cogeneration capacities, which is most likely a consequence of the specific structure of the Russian electricity and heat market.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.