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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2024-5-55-73</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-4800</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИНАНСОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>FINANCIAL ECONOMICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Эволюция доктрины долг—капитал в свете цифровизации финансовых инструментов</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The evolution of the debt—equity doctrine in the light of financial instruments’ digitalization</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1225-7263</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Криничанский</surname><given-names>К. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Krinichansky</surname><given-names>K. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Криничанский Константин Владимирович - д. э. н., профессор кафедры финансовых рынков и финансового инжиниринга, г. н. с. Института финансовых исследований Финуниверситета.</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Konstantin V. Krinichansky.</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">kkrin@ya.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3071-4405</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Понаморенко</surname><given-names>В. Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Ponamorenko</surname><given-names>V. E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Понаморенко Владислав Евгеньевич - д. ю. н., профессор Высшей школы юриспруденции и администрирования НИУ ВШЭ, проф. кафедры финансовых рынков и финансового инжиниринга Финуниверситета.</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Vladislav E. Ponamorenko.</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">vladpon@inbox.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации; Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation; HSE University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>09</day><month>05</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>55</fpage><lpage>73</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4800">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4800</self-uri><abstract><p>Излагаются основания применения дихотомии долг—капитал (debt— equity) в типологии финансовых инструментов, анализируются противоречия и недостатки сложившегося подхода к классификации. Показано, что «ловушка» debt—equity дихотомии становится следствием эффекта колеи, главным образом формируемого инерцией налоговой системы. Отмечается, что использование debt—equity дихотомии влечет формалистский подход к классификации, не приближающий к ясному разграничению контрактов по критериям распределения риска и вознаграждения и ограничению постконтрактного оппортунизма. Показано, как основания доктрины debt—equity могут быть ослаблены применительно к цифровым активам. В пользу этого говорит генезис цифровых активов в специфической технологической среде, которая задает свои критерии и рамки для типологизации инструментов. Другая группа аргументов исходит из того, что мир цифровых активов когерентен специфической среде венчурного инвестирования, которая показывает необходимость преодолеть рамки debt—equity дихотомии для реализации задач рисковых инвесторов и структурирования отношений вовлекаемых в проекты сторон. Такая востребованность привела к возникновению ряда инструментов, которые невозможно классифицировать ни как долг, ни как акции, в том числе использующих токенизацию и контрактные соглашения, применяемые краудфандинговыми платформами. Интеллектуальных усилий, позволявших ранее удовлетворительно объяснять выбор компаниями стилей и способов финансирования, сегодня недостаточно, чтобы согласовать теории структуры капитала с практикой финансирования, использующего цифровые активы.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article outlines the basics for using the debt—equity dichotomy in the financial instruments typology and analyzes the contradictions and short-comings of the existing approach to classification. It is shown that the “trap” of the debt—equity dichotomy comes from the path dependence process, mainly formed by the inertia of the tax system. It is noted that the applying of the debt—equity dichotomy entails a formalist approach to classification, which does not bring closer to the clarity of the delimitation of contracts according to the criteria of risk and reward distribution, and restrictions on post-contractual opportunism. Arguments are given to explain why the foundations of the debt— equity doctrine may be weakened in relation to crypto assets. This is supported by the fact that the genesis of digital assets occurs in a specific technological context, which determines its own criteria and framework for the typology of instruments. Another set of arguments comes from the fact that the world of crypto assets appears to be coherent with the specific environment of venture capital investment. This environment, in turn, arouses the demand for overcoming the debt—equity dichotomy to implement the tasks of risky investors and structuring the relations of the parties involved in projects. This demand has now led to the emergence of a number of instruments that cannot be classified as either debt or equity, including those using the construct of tokens or contractual agreements used by crowdfunding platforms. Overall, the intellectual effort that previously satisfactorily explained companies’ choices of financing styles and modes is now insufficient to reconcile capital structure theories with the practice of digital asset financing.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>эволюция финансовых инструментов</kwd><kwd>долговые инструменты</kwd><kwd>долевые инструменты</kwd><kwd>гибриды</kwd><kwd>цифровые активы</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>evolution of financial instruments</kwd><kwd>debt instruments</kwd><kwd>equity instruments</kwd><kwd>hybrid finance instruments</kwd><kwd>crypto assets</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Банк России (2020). Цифровой рубль. Доклад для общественных консультаций. Москва.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bank of Russia (2020). A digital ruble. Consultation paper. 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