voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2024-6-44-72voprecotest-4772Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОТРАСЛЕВЫХ РЫНКОВINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONБизнес-ассоциации и адаптация к санкциям российских предприятий обрабатывающей промышленности: сравнение 2018 г. и 2022 г.Business associations and the adaptation of Russian manufacturing enterprises to sanctions: 2018 vs. 2022https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0091-5388КазунА. П.KazunA. P.

Казун Антон Павлович, к. соц. н., директор Института анализа предприятий и рынков НИУ ВШЭ

Москва

Anton P. Kazun

Moscow

akazun@hse.ruhttps://orcid.org/0009-0008-8659-3797МуковнинС. К.MukovninS. K.

Муковнин Сергей Константинович, аспирант, стажер-исследователь Международного центра изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ 

Москва

Sergey K. Mukovnin

Moscow

smukovnin@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation202405062024064472Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20242024Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4772

Рассматривается вопрос о том, помогают ли деловые ассоциации российским компаниям адаптироваться к международным санкциям. Для ответа на него использованы материалы опросов руководителей российских компаний обрабатывающей промышленности в 2018 и 2022 гг., репрезентативных по размеру и отраслям. Факт членства в бизнес-ассоциации имеет двоякое значение: с одной стороны, ассоциации могут выступать в качестве инструмента адаптации к санкционным шокам (прямой эффект), а с другой — в силу эффекта самоотбора в них состоят более устойчивые компании, которые меньше боятся внешних шоков и менее склонны предпринимать активные действия (косвенный эффект). Эти эффекты разделены с помощью моделей с медиатором. Результаты расчетов показывают, что в 2018 г. члены деловых ассоциаций оценивали последствия санкций как менее серьезные и реже предпринимали какие-либо действия, возможно, из-за того, что с 2014 г. прошло достаточно времени для адаптации к ним. Напротив, в 2022 г. факт членства в ассоциациях не ослаблял восприятие руководителями компаний серьезности санкций, но был выявлен прямой эффект, проявляющийся в более быстрой реакции членов ассоциаций на санкции, включая поиск новых поставщиков и сокращение издержек.

This study explores the role of business associations in adaptation of Russian companies to international sanctions. To address this query, we have used survey data from leaders of Russian manufacturing companies in 2018 and 2022, which are representative in terms of size and sectors. Membership in a business association has a dual nature: on the one hand, associations can act as a tool for adapting to sanction shocks (direct effect); on the other hand, because of the self-selection effect, they tend to comprise more proactive and resilient companies, which are less fearful of external shocks and, as a result, may be less inclined to take active measures (indirect effect). We distinguish these effects from our analysis by constructing models using a mediator. The findings indicate that in 2018, members of business associations perceived the consequences of sanctions as less severe and were less likely to take any action, possibly because sufficient time had passed for adaptation to them since 2014. Conversely, in 2022, membership in associations did not reduce leaders’ perceptions of the seriousness of sanctions. However, we have found a direct effect of associations, revealing in a quicker response of their members to sanctions, including seeking new suppliers and reducing costs.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.