voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64voprecotest-4626Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО СЕКТОРАPUBLIC ECONOMICSПереход к электронным процедурам в государственных закупках в условиях фаворитизмаEstimation of electronic procedures effects in public procurement under favoritismhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3962-7428БелевС. Г.BelevS. G.

Белев Сергей Геннадьевич, старший научный сотрудник лаборатории исследований бюджетной политики Института прикладных экономических исследований (ИПЭИ) РАНХиГС

Москва

Murat B. Bakeev

Moscow

Belev@ranepa.ruhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0169-1451ВетеринаровВ. В.VeterinarovV. V.

Ветеринаров Виктор Викторович, научный сотрудник Лондонской школы экономики и политических наук 

Лондон

Victor V. Veterinarov

London

v.veterinarov@lse.ac.ukhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4732-8818МатвеевЕ. О.MatveevE. O.

Матвеев Евгений Олегович, научный сотрудник лаборатории исследований бюджетной политики ИПЭИ РАНХиГС, аспирант экономического факультета МГУ

Москва

Evgenii O. Matveev

Moscow

matveev-eo@ranepa.ruРоссийская Академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ; Московский государственный университет имени М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияRussian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Lomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian FederationЛондонская школа экономики и политических наукВеликобританияLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceUnited Kingdom202306092023094764Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20232023Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4626

Исследуются эффекты перехода к электронным процедурам определения поставщика при проведении конкурсов на результаты НИОКР в России. Электронный формат проведения государственных закупок может способствовать увеличению количества участников торгов и экономии, но при наличии фаворитизма эффект электронных процедур может быть ограничен. Для выявления и оценки эффектов электронных процедур собраны микроданные по 4517 открытым конкурсам на результаты НИОКР за период с 16.12.2016 по 20.12.2021. До 2019 г. практически отсутствовали электронные конкурсы, а начиная с 2019 г. все открытые конкурсы нужно проводить в электронной форме, что создает квазиэкспериментальные условия. Фаворитизм определяется на основе частоты взаимодействия заказчика и поставщика. Результаты эконометрического моделирования позволяют сделать вывод, что переход к электронным процедурам повышает конкуренцию в открытых конкурсах и приводит к росту экономии, однако этот эффект слабее в закупках сучастием потенциально аффилированных заказчика и поставщика. Одним из основных каналов негативного влияния фаворитизма выступает завышение качественных оценок аффилированным поставщикам.

This paper investigates the effects of electronic procedures for supplier selection in public procurement multi criteria auctions (with a selection of a winner based not only on the price criterion) for the results of research and development (R&D) work in Russia. The electronic procedures in public procurement can increase the number of bidders and lead to lower final contract prices. However, in the presence of favoritism, the effect of electronic procedures may be limited. To identify and evaluate the effects of introduction of electronic procedures, we collected microdata on 4517 composite auctions for R&D results for the period from 12/16/2016 to 12/20/2021. Until 2019, there were practically no electronic multi criteria auctions, and starting from 2019, all multi criteria auctions were in electronic form, which creates quasi-experimental conditions. Favoritism is evaluated based on the frequency of interaction between the customer and the supplier. The results of econometric modeling suggest that the introduction of the electronic procedures do increase competition in multi criteria auctions and lead to lower final contract prices, but the effect is weaker in auctions with potentially affiliated customer and supplier. Moreover, one of the main channels of the negative effect of favoritism is inflated quality criterion scores of affiliated suppliers.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.