voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-32-51voprecotest-450Research ArticleИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯINSTITUTIONAL STUDIESКоррупция «одного окна»: теория и эмпирический анализCorruption as “one‑stop‑shop”: theory and empirical analysisКочневР. Ю.KochnevR. Yu.

Кочнев Роман Юрьевич, выпускник Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики».

Москва.

Moscow.

ПолищукЛ. И.PolishchukL. I.

Полищук Леонид Иосифович, профессор.

Москва.

Moscow.

lpolishchuk@hse.ruРубинА. Ю.RubinA. Yu.

Рубин Александр Юрьевич, аспирант.

Москва.

Moscow.

Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ).РоссияNational Research University Higher School of Economics.Russian Federation201820092018093251Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20182018Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/450

В статье дан сравнительный анализ последствий централизованной и децентрализованной коррупции для производственного сектора. Представленные теоретические и эмпирические свидетельства указывают на то, что при определенных условиях децентрализованная коррупция ложится более тяжким бременем на предприятия и ухудшает их доступ к инфраструктуре и другим общественным факторам производства. Указанные эффекты обусловлены потерями, возникающими при сочетании «эффекта безбилетника» и «трагедии общины». В эмпирической части статьи использованы материалы опроса российских предприятий, проведенного в рамках проекта BEEPS.

We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.