voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2023-2-5-17voprecotest-4327Research ArticleВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИISSUES OF THEORYЭкономика банков и финансовых кризисов (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2022 года)Economics of banks and financial markets (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2022)https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1581-9951СонинК. И.SoninK. I.

Сонин Константин Исаакович (ksonin@gmail.com), к. ф.-м. н., профессор 

Чикаго

Chicago

ksonin@gmail.comЧикагский университетСоединённые Штаты АмерикиUniversity of ChicagoUnited States20230302202302517Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20232023Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/4327

Нобелевская премия 2022 г. по экономике присуждена Дугласу Даймонду из Чикагского университета, Филипу Дибвигу из Вашингтонского университета в Сент-Луисе и Бену Бернанке из Института Брукингса за фундаментальные исследования экономики банковского сектора и его связи с финансовыми кризисами. Модель Даймонда—Дибвига стала основным теоретическим обоснованием роли банков в преобразовании сроков жизни финансовых инструментов, одновременно объяснив, почему угроза банковской паники является естественным следствием этой роли. Бернанке исследовал роль банков как носителей ценной информации о заемщиках; глубина и продолжительность спада стали следствием, а не причиной закрытия банков в период Великой депрессии в США. Эти теоретические и эмпирические работы сыграли ключевую роль в определении правительственной политики в США и других странах во время глобального финансового кризиса.

The article provides a brief introduction to the research on banks and finan- cial crises, for which the 2022 Nobel prize in economic sciences was awarded. Forty years ago, the works of Diamond and Dybvig highlighted the critical role banks play in maturity transformation and explained why this role makes banking crises a natural byproduct, thus providing a theoretical basis for modern banking regulation. The concurrent work by Bernanke on the Great Depression, the worst peace-time economic crisis in mature market economies, demonstrated that banks’ closures were a critical factor in making the depression so deep and prolonged.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.