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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprecotest</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы экономики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Ekonomiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">0042-8736</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-45-79</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprecotest-43</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УЧАСТИЕ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Государственная компания: сфера проявления «провалов государства» или «провалов рынка»?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>State-owned company: Detection Zone of Government Failure or market Failure?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Радыгин</surname><given-names>А. Д.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Radygin</surname><given-names>A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>д.  э.  н., проф., член Совета директоров Института экономической политики имени Е. Т. Гайдара, декан экономического факультета РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">arad@rane.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Симачев</surname><given-names>Ю. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Simachev</surname><given-names>Y.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>к.  т.  н., главный научный сотрудник Межведомственного аналитического центра (МАЦ) (Москва), ведущий научный сотрудник ИПЭИ РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">simachev@iacenter.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Энтов</surname><given-names>Р. М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Entov</surname><given-names>R.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>академик РАН (Москва)</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">noemail@neicon.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-3"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Институт экономической политики имени Е. Т. Гайдара; РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ (Москва)<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (Moscow, Russia); Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia)<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru">Межведомственный аналитический центр (МАЦ) (Москва); РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia); Inter-Departmental Analytical Center (Moscow, Russia)<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-3"><aff xml:lang="ru">РАН (Москва)<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia)<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>01</month><year>2015</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>45</fpage><lpage>79</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 2015</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2015</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP</copyright-holder><license xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/43">https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/43</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье анализируются деятельность государственных компаний и их место в структуре рыночных взаимодействий с точки зрения современных подходов к изучению «провалов государства» и «провалов рынка», а также условия системного укоренения прав частной собственности. Помимо общетеоретического рассмотрения издержек функционирования государственных компаний, авторы обращаются к конкретному опыту современной российской экономики, последовательно изучая возможности и паллиативы приватизационной политики, опыт формирования и риски функционирования государственных корпораций. Особое внимание в статье уделено проблемам ограничения мотивации к улучшению институциональной среды в целом и, напротив, расширению практики прямого вмешательства государства для решения задач экономического развития. Рассматриваются конкретные направления, по которым сужаются возможности реализовать права частной собственности в связи с экспансией государственного сектора де-юре и де-факто.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This article analyzes state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market interactions in the context of modern approaches to the study of government failures and market failures, as well as the conditions of the system of private property rights rooting. Besides the general theoretical consideration of the costs of functioning of state-owned companies, the authors refer to the specific experience of the Russian economy, consistently analyzing the opportunities and palliatives of the current privatization policy, the experience of establishment and the risks of functioning of state corporations. Particular attention is paid to the problem of limited motivation to improve the institutional environment in general and, on the contrary, the expansion of the practice of direct government intervention in order to solve the problems of economic development. The authors also consider specific areas where there is a restriction of private property rights in connection with the expansion of the public sector, de jure and de facto.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>государственные компании</kwd><kwd>приватизация</kwd><kwd>провалы государства</kwd><kwd>провалы рынка</kwd><kwd>политические рынки</kwd><kwd>государственное регулирование</kwd><kwd>аллокационная эффективность</kwd><kwd>права собственности</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>public enterprises</kwd><kwd>privatization</kwd><kwd>government failures</kwd><kwd>market failures</kwd><kwd>political markets</kwd><kwd>government regulation</kwd><kwd>allocative efficiency</kwd><kwd>property rights</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Андерсон Р. (2012). Просто не стой на пути: как государство может помочь бизнесу в бедных странах. 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