voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2018-5-139-150voprecotest-406Research ArticleНАУЧНЫЕ СООБЩЕНИЯRESEARCH NOTESПоведенческие теории денежно-кредитной политики: кадровая независимость, ротация руководства и влияние гендераThe behavioral economics of monetary policyМоисеевС. Р.MoiseevS. R.

д. э. н., советник первого заместителя Председателя Банка России (Москва)

msr@cbr.ruБанк РоссииРоссияThe Bank of RussiaRussian Federation20182005201805139150Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20182018Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/406

В большинстве исследований анализ денежно-кредитной политики основан на макроэкономике. В то же время сформировался новый междисциплинарный подход, находящийся на пересечении макро- и поведенческой экономики. Альтернативные теории описывают влияние кадровой независимости денежных властей, карьерных стимулов, личных характеристик и гендерной диверсификации руководства центрального банка на результаты денежно-кредитной политики. Они позволяют объяснить особенности кадровой политики и профиль персонала в центральном банке.

Macroeconomics is the basis of monetary policy analysis in most researches. At the same time a new cross disciplinary approach has emerged - at the crossroad of macroeconomics and behavioral economics. Alternative theories describe the impact of personnel independence of monetary authorities, career incentives, staff properties and the gender diversity of central bank governors on monetary policy results. They shed the light on personnel policy characteristics and the staff profile in a central bank.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.