References

voprecotest

Вопросы экономики

Voprosy Ekonomiki

0042-8736

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

10.32609/0042-8736-2018-3-102-129

voprecotest-388

Research Article

ЭКОНОМИКА ПРЕСТУПНОСТИ

ECONOMICS OF CRIME

Кто отвечает за безопасность? Разделение труда между государственной и частной защитой от преступности

Who is in charge of security? Division oflabour between public and private security producers

Василенок

Н. А.

Vasilenok

N. A.

лаборант научно-учебной лаборатории (НУЛ) прикладного анализа институтов и социального капитала Института институциональных исследований (ИНИИ) Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ; Москва)

nvasilenok@hse.ru

Яркин

А. М.

Yarkin

A. M.

м. н. с. НУЛ прикладного анализа институтов и социального капитала ИНИИ НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

ayarkin@hse.ru

Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ)РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation

2018

20032018

03102129

2018

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/388

В статье предлагается первый в русскоязычной литературе обзор современных исследований в области экономики преступности. Особое внимание уделяется роли государственных и частных инвестиций в безопасность. Подчеркивается роль неравенства и институциональной среды в формировании системы защитных мер и итогового распределения преступности. Представлены результаты эмпирического анализа на уровне регионов России, где выявлена значимая связь между неравенством и государственными и частными инвестициями в безопасность, а также обнаружены существенные различия между более и менее демократичными регионами.

This paper presents the first in the Russian literature review of research devoted to the roles of private and public investment in security in the economics of crime. We describe theoretical and empirical papers that deal with the strength of the deterrence and diversion effects, as well as the interaction between different security measures. Special attention is given to the roles that income inequality and institutional set-up play in the formation of the profile of security measures and the resulting distribution of crime. We also present empirical results based on the Russian regional data, which reveal a significant relationship between inequality and the ratio of private to public security measures, as well as substantial differences between more and less democratic regions.

экономика преступностиобщественные благасмешанные рынкинеравенствополитические институты

economics of crimepublic goodsmixed marketsinequalitypolitical institutions

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.