voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2018-3-80-101voprecotest-387Research ArticleИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯINSTITUTIONAL STUDIES«Неортодоксальные» быстрорастущие фирмы-«газели» и порядок ограниченного доступа“Unorthodox” fast-growing firms (gazelles) and North’s limited access orderЮдановА. Ю.YudanovA. Yu.

д. э. н., проф., ординарный профессор Финансового университета при Правительстве РФ (Москва)

yudanov@yandex.ruЯковлевА. А.YakovlevA. A.

к. э. н., ординарный профессор, директор Института анализа предприятий и рынков Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» (Москва)

ayakovlev@hse.ruФинансовый университет при Правительстве РФРоссияFinancial University under the Government of RFRussian FederationНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation2018200320180380101Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20182018Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/387

Объектом исследования в статье выступают «неортодоксальные» фирмы-«газели» - быстрорастущие компании, рост которых обусловлен административным ресурсом или аффилированностью с крупными корпорациями. Установлено, что значительную роль в коммерческом успехе таких фирм играет рента. Тем не менее, как предсказывает концепция порядка ограниченного доступа (Д. Норта и соавторов) и вопреки стандартной трактовке, рента в определенных условиях может играть позитивную роль в переходной экономике. Среди основных паттернов развития «неортодоксальных» фирм-«газелей» в России на эмпирическом материале выявлены положительные сценарии. В статье обсуждаются условия, при которых такие фирмы могут стать инструментом государства развития.

The subject of the article is “unorthodox” gazelles - politically-connected or big business-affiliated fast-growing firms. It is established that rents play a significant role in the commercial success of such firms. Nevertheless, as predicted by the well-known “limited access framework” (by D. North and co-authors), and contrary to the standard interpretation of rents, the latter can play a positive role in the transitional economy. The authors have identified on empirical material some clearly positive scenarios among the main patterns of the development of “unorthodox” gazelles in Russia. The article discusses the conditions under which “unorthodox” gazelles can become an instrument of developmental state.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.