voprecotestВопросы экономикиVoprosy Ekonomiki0042-8736Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP10.32609/0042-8736-2018-2-56-73voprecotest-377Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКАECONOMIC POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICEОграничения конкуренции на примере российских государственных закупокRestrictions of competition: The case of Russian public procurementОстровнаяМ. В.OstrovnayaM. V.

к. э. н., м.  н.  с. Международной научно-учебной лаборатории институционального анализа экономических реформ Института институциональных исследований Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» (ЛИА ИНИИ НИУ ВШЭ; Москва)

mostrovnaya@hse.ruПодколзинаЕ. А.PodkolzinaE. A.

к. э. н., старший научный сотрудник ЛИА ИНИИ НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)

epodk@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation201820022018025673Copyright © Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP, 20182018Voprosy Ekonomiki, NPVoprosy Ekonomiki, NPhttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/377

Подробная фиксация условий контракта позволяет заказчикам получить услугу, которая соответствует их интересам, но может снизить конкуренцию на торгах. В статье рассматривается, какое сочетание условий приводит к ограничению участия в закупках и последующему росту цен. Использованные данные о государственных закупках в Нижегородской области в 2008-2013 гг. показывают, что требование располагать АЗС в различных районах города/региона наиболее сильно ограничивает привлекательность закупки для потенциальных поставщиков. Хотя ограничения часто рассматриваются как инструмент фаворитизма, их использование может быть обусловлено характером деятельности заказчиков.

Detailed fixing of contract terms allows procurers to get a service that fits their interests, but can reduce competition in auctions. We examine which combinations of conditions lead to restriction of entry in public procurement and subsequent increases in price. Using data on public procurement in Nizhny Novgorod region in 2008-2013, we show that the requirement to locate gasoline stations in different districts of the city/region most strongly limits the attractiveness of procurement for potential suppliers. While restrictions are often seen as an instrument of favoritism, we show that they may be used due to the nature of the activities of procurers.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.